A comparison of seventeen contingency models for system development (SD) led to the conclusion that no model supports all requested activities: diagnosing the context, describing alternative approaches, matching context and approach, looking at social organizational issues, and supporting a dynamic ® t between context and approach. This study paid special attention to the social and organizational aspects of system development. Our contingency model speci® es ® ve possible types of risk (functional uncertainty, con¯ict potential, technical uncertainty and resistance potential) in system development that should be controlled. For each type, a corresponding proposition about its control was derived from this m odel and analysed in seven system development processes. We succeeded in explaining the outcome of the development process through the ® t between context and situation, thereby gaining some preliminary support for the model. Still, the limitations of such a contingency model are to be taken seriously.
Introduction
The objective of this article is to present a contingency m odel for the control of the social and organizational aspects of the developm ent of inform ation system s for work-organizations and to report the preliminary evidence supporting this model. W hile in the seventies attention was focused on the construction of the one ideal m ethod for system developm ent, during the eigh ties peopl e became aware of the im possibility of this task. As information systems can be developed in different ways, the outco me of the developm ent process depend s on the`® t' between cont ext and developm ent approach. Therefore unive rsalist m odels have been replaced by contextual or contingency models, in which the system developm ent (SD ) method or approach taken, is matched with relevant contextual or contingency factors.
After giving an overview of existing contingency models for SD, this paper will discuss the framework and assumptions of our model and will introduce the propositions following from it. Subsequently, we will present our research m ethod and the results of our exploratory study of seven SD processes, analysed with our model.
The model is based on the assumptio n that system developm ent can be seen as an organizational change process, that is, an intervening process in a social system. From a practical point of view the m odel has the follow ing purposes. First, it offers m anagers and system developers or any other dom inant actors in charge of SD processes an overview of the possible strategies the team can pursue in accomplishing their task. Second, the m odel is m eant to support the dom inant actors to continuously diagnose the nature of their task in its context. Diagnosing contextual characteristics should help the dom inant actors in choosing an effective strategy.
Th eory
According to structural contingency theory, the social structure of an organization should ® t its context in order to be effective (e.g. Galbraith 1973) . Transferring this logic to system developm ent , the approach to SD shoul d ® t the particula r context in which the developm ent takes place (e.g. Ciborra et al. 1980 , Iivary 1986 , Floyd 1986 , Olle et al. 1988 . Structural contingency theory gives an overall perspective of managerial adaptation to external constraints, but the speci® c structural dim ensions to be adapted to, as well as the speci® c elements of context that affect structural choices are left unspec i® ed (Pfeffer 1982: 148) . Although it has high face validity, the substance of the theory is not clear (Schoonho ven 1981: 350) .
Similarly, while the necessity of matching context and Scenarios for system developm ent Assum ptions about epistemology and ontology SD approach seems obvious , adoption and translation of this principle into speci® c models offering prescriptions for ways to realize the m atching of context and SD approach taken, have remained quite troublesom e (e.g. Lyytinen 1987 , Nielsen 1990 . Table 1 sum marizes 17 models developed for this purpose in the last decade. These m odels are meant to support three im portant activities in choosing an SD approach:
(1) Diagnosing the context. The m odel de® nes which contextual factors should be taken into consideration. A direct com parison of the models displayed in table 1 is dif® cult because of different or lacking de® nitions and varying levels of analysi s. Furthermore, the a priori distinction between context and approach variables in a contingency model will always, to a certain extent, be arbitrary. Contextual factors are by de® nition exogen ous to the developm ent process, that is, they are given and cannot be in¯uenced. How ever, many factors, such as the quality and quantity of hum an resources that can be appointed to the project, will be exogen ous in some instances and endoge nous in others. This explains why, for exam ple, the expertise of the engineers is seen as a contextual factor in model 11, 
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Balance necessity and possibility to lay down plans while in m odel 1 it is labelled a dimension of the SD approach. For these reasons we will not evaluate the content of these m odels. W e will only evaluate the extent to which these m odels suppor t all three aforementioned activities. Furtherm ore, we want to assess whether two other issues are addressed in the m odels.
(4) Looking at social and organizational issues. As has been explained in the introduction we regard SD as an organizational change process. Therefore, we are primarily interested in knowin g whether social and organizational issues are taken into consider ation in the models. (5) Suppor ting a dynam ic ® t betw een context and approa ch. During the developm ent process contextual factors and/or approach can change. Therefore, it is im portant that the ® t between context and approach is assessed not only at the start, but also during the SD process.
Diagnosing the contextÐ In models 6 and 9 the amount of contextual factors to be taken into consideration is unlim ited, making it dif® cult to test the models empirically. Most models (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13) do not only take the characteristics of the context of SD into consideration, but also the kind of system that has to be developed. Models 15 and 16 only diagnose the context in terms of the solution chose n, and as a consequence, they can only be applied in later stages of the developm ent process. From our point of view of SD being an organizational change process, we ® nd the last two m odels less relevant.
Describing alternative approa chesÐ In order to describe the choice of an SD approach, six models (3, 4, 11, 12, 15, 16 ) offer a typolog y of SD approaches. Others (1, 2, 8, 10, 14) can best be characterized as describing one or more dimensions on which an SD approach can vary. Three m odels (7, 9, 17) give a typology based on variations on a few underlying dim ensions. A small m inority of the models (5, 13) do not, or not yet (6) support this activity.
M atching context and approac hÐ In model 6, Episkopou and W ood-H arper (1986) argue for a ® t between context and approach, but the only guidelines they offer are those of Naumann et al (1980) . M odels 5 and 13 do not address the ® t between context and approach at all. Thus, they are not really contingency models. They have been include d in table 1 as they are well know n and have the explicit goal to support the control of the risks of SD processes, a feature they have in com mon with m ost of the other m odels cited here. M odel 9 is descriptive in nature and consequent ly lacks guidelines for the matching of context and approach. The other models do offer suppor t for the matching of context and approach. Som e models, for instance those of Shom enta et al. (1983) and W issema et al. (1988) are based on empirical data. How ever, for m ost of the models it is not clear whether and with which results they have been tested empirically. In addition, the guide lines offered are rarely based on explicit theoretical considerations. In connection to this, outcom e criteria for matching context and approach are seldom put forward explicitly. Thus, it remains unclear what is m eant by successful or effective SD.
Looking at social and organizational issuesÐ Social and political factors often determine the outcom e of SD processe s (e.g. Riesewijk and W armerdam 1988, Van Offenbeek 1993) . How ever, as many models have their origin in system engineering, most of them do not cover these issues (1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16) or only to a limited extent (2, 14, 17) . This means that these models are based on the assum ption that organizational reality is know n and stable, and that all actors in SD have the same know n goals and interests. Only four m odels (3, 6, 9, 12) take into account that organizational reality often cannot be understood in an objective way and is political in nature.
Suppor ting a dynam ic ® t betw een context and approac hÐ
Only three models (1, 3, 13) explicitly discuss the subject of changes during the SD process. To sum marize, no model ful® ls all ® ve requirem ents, and, in general, more em pirical testing is neede d. This state of affairs induced our em pirical study in which the following question was exam ined: How can a match betw een contextual characteristics on the one hand and system developm ent (SD) approa ch on the other hand be realized in order to obtain successfu l developm ent? As the models developed thus far do not emphasize the perspective of SD as a special kind of organizational change , we tried to form ulate a model that can com plem ent several of the m odels that regard SD from a technical system engineering point of view, by incorporating social and organization al contextual factors. This was our primary objective. W e used the insights offered by existing models, where this did not contradict this objective. A review of organizational as well as cognitive-social psycho logical literature, preceded the formulation of the contingency m odel. In the next section this model will be outlined.
A con tingency m od el
The m odel is com posed of three groups of variables: (a) contingency or contextual factors, leading to ® ve types of risks; (b) approach characteristics and (c) outcom e factors, indicating the effectiveness of the SD process.
In this article we limit ourselves to an outline of the risk pro® le (section 3.1) and approach characteristics (section 3.2). In section 3.3 propositions are form ulated on how the occurrence of different types of risks can be controlled by m atching the approach characteristics on the basis of existing literature. Subsequently, in section 3.4 we consider the way in which such a contingency model should be used.
Contextua l diagno sis: establishing a risk-pro® le
In our framework we limit ourselve s to those contextual factors that cause a risk in terms of the effectiveness of SD (see table 2 ). W e distinguish four types of substantial risks. These have been derived from the four interdependent dom ains of the organization as de® ned by Leavitt (1965) : tasks, structure, technology, and people. According to his m odel, a change in one of the dom ains will to a greater or lesser extent cause change s in the other dom ains. Furtherm ore, attention should be given to the m aterial preconditions, a ® fth type of risk of another origin. This last type of risk de® nes the degrees of freedom the dom inant actors have in m atching the other four risk types with their SD approa ch.
Func tional uncertainty refers to the risk that the actors choose a wrong solution or solve the wrong problem . The m agnitude of this risk is determined by characteristics of the task system in the existing situation and of the (expected) changes in the task system . High com plexity, low stability of the tasks, and having no acqua intance with the tasks at which the system developm ent is directed will heighten the functional uncertainty with which the system developers are confronted. So will obscurity of the problem(s), unknow n goal(s) or needs, and the absence of criteria against which the solution will be judged. Two other potential factors are the anticipated extensiveness of the changes in the task system and lack of experience of the organizational m embers with SD.
Con¯ict potential refers to the risk that incompatible needs and interests will hamper problem solving. It is determined by the degree of pluralism in the existing structure com pared with its desired uniformity. This type of risk is increased when m ore parties are involved whose ideas, langu age and/or interests are heteroge neous and when the scope of the SD process (in terms of people and ® nance ) is large. This risk is also increased when the required integration among the parties is high and when the developm ent is depend ent on third parties or on the results or progress of other projects.
Technical uncertainty refers to the risk that the conceptua lized solution cannot be realized. The m agnitude of this risk is determ ined by characteristics of the technological aspect system in the existing situation and by the technologic al aspects of the change . In system developm ent this risk increases when the existing technological system is com plex and relatively new; when technical experts are unacqu ainted with the software environm ent, the com plexity of the realization of the system is high, and the quality and com m itm ent of the technical experts is low. Resistance potential refers to the risk that mem bers of the organization will be dissatis® ed with the realized solution, because they feel its implementation would decrease the quality of their working life. The m agnitude of this risk is determined by the changeabi lity of the organizational members concerned, compared with characteristics of the wanted change . The risk is increased when the workers (manage ment) have a low change potential, a low willingness to change, and when the qualitative and quantitative im pact on the work organization is high.
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Material preconditions refers to the risk that the SD process will not pay for itself or will be aborted prem aturely due to lack of resources. This risk is de® ned as the am ount of energy neede d, com pared with the amount available , that is, budget, capacity in terms of hum an, machine and com puter resources, tim e pressure, and importance of the SD process. Material preconditions de® ne the extent to which an approach needs to be ef® cient.
A three level model of the SD approa ch
W e distinguish three levels of SD (approach): the strategic, the tactical and the operational leve l (see table  3 ). These are three perspectives from which the functioning of an SD process can be described and analysed . The levels provide insight into the nature of the SD process, the structuring of the process and the interaction within the process, respectively. Table 3 speci® es the relevant dimensions on which the approach can vary.
At the strategic level the dom inant actors establish at which parts of the organization the developm ent is directed: the de® nition of the problem system. Furtherm ore, when considering system developm ent as organizing, the SD process itself can be seen as a collaboration of a num ber of people which should be given im plicit or explicit direction: the orientation of the problem -solving system. W hether the emphasis is on a problem or a solution orientation is an im portant strategic choice. That is the extent to which the SD process is directed towards diagnosing and analysing the problem s and needs, or towards the developm ent of a system for given goals and needs. Often the approach will alternate between a problem and a solution orientation. Moreover, the orientation de® nes the extent to which the problem-solving system is related to social organizational as oppose d to technical adm inistrative issues within the problem system . This choice conce rns the issues that will receive most weight and attention in the SD process. Secondly, the SD process is structured at the tactical level. The structure of the process encom passes the differentiation of the necessary SD activities and the coordination am ong these activities. Differentiation means breaking dow n or decom posing the problem-solving system into activities, which can be distinguished in terms of tim e and/or people performing the separate activities. Mintzberg (1979) describes ® ve coordinating mechanisms within organizations: mutual adjustm ent, direct supervision, and three forms of standardization, of skills, work processes and output. These coordinating m echanism s can also be found in SD (e.g Heemstra 1990).
The third level of strategy is concerned with the operational activities within the SD process. From a psycho logical point of view, this process consists of social 255 Scenarios for system developm ent (Kotter and Schlesinger 1979 , Markus 1983 , Ives and Olson 1984 , and negotiating (Vaas 1988 , Black ler 1990 . Interactions can be aimed at different functions at the same tim e, or the functions may involve activities that are clearly separated in tim e and place.
Propositions
Existing theory led to propositions conce rning the m atching of context and SD . The starting point of our framework was that the choice of approach shoul d be geared to the faced or expec ted risks. These risks can be political or cognitive in nature (Episkopo u and W oodHarper 1986, Hirschheim and Klein 1989) . Organizational reality is not simple, it is not ordered through know n principles, nor is it stable and unam biguou s. Moreover, not everyone has the same objectives, interests and views. Therefore, dom inant actors will often ® nd them selves in situations that are charact erized by uncertainty and/or heterogeneity of goals and organizational conservatism. If, as a result of this the actors perceive high risks, m easures to control these risks should be taken. For each type of risk a proposition specifying the required measures was form ulated. W ithin the scope of this paper we restrict ourselves to the propositions that relate to the four substantial risks.
W hen functional uncertainty is high, information relevant to the system to be developed is missing and consequently excha nge of information between problem system and problem±solution system is neede d at the operational level Jago 1988, Van Oostrum and Rabbie 1988) . This interaction should be initiated in an early stage, when the information processing capacity of the problem±solution system is highe st (Ashmos et al. 1990 , McFarlan 1981 , Davis and Olson 1985 , Cressey 1989 . Moreover, collective learning processes will also have to take place (Argyris and Scho È n 1978, Swieringa and W ierdsma 1992) . At the tactical level, learning processes shoul d be stimula ted by an iterative process m odel (Naumann et al. 1980) , thereby providing the necessary feedback loops. M odels, prototypes and pilot sites can be part of such an interactive approach.
Proposition 1: High functional un certainty requires (a) an early interaction between know ledgeable users and system develope rs, and, (b) an iterative proce ss mode l aimed at the exchange of inform ation and learning.
W hen con¯ict potential is high, more interdependent parties are involved, and, therefore, m ore information will have to be processed (Davis and Olson 1985) . Ironically, it is not only more important, but also m ore dif® cult to realize effective interactions under conditions of high con¯ict potential. Interactions will unfold most easily when con¯ict potential is low (Algera and Koopm an 1986, Vroom and Yetton 1973) . Rational excha nge of information will not be suf® cient, as different interests and de® nitions of reality are involved. The goals of SD process will have to be negotiated. Therefore, interactions should take place in early stages of the process. According to Vroom and Jago (1988) , Heller et al. (1988) , and Van Oostrum and Rabbie (1988) the creation of construc tive con¯icts leads to better decision m aking and will not enlarge the differences in opinion. Representational form s of interaction am ong groups will prohibit chaos . Apart from negot iation, collective learning will also be necessary, especially in the case of simultaneous high functional uncertainty. As groups are not acqua inted with each other' s language, assets and images, interactions lead to highe r intersubjectivity. Values and norm s will be questioned (Hirschheim and Klein 1989) . Under such circumstances Bouw en and Fry (1991) found a learning-confrontation strategy to be more successf ul. At the tactical level formal coordination is necessary to make and record decisions and com m unicate them . If closely supervised by a higher, neutral pow er centre, negotiation will be more successf ul Yetton 1973, M astenbroek 1982) .
Proposition 2: A high con¯ict potential requires (a) early and representat ional interaction am ong the user groups involved, aimed at negotiating and learning, and (b) formal coordinat ion of these interactions.
When technical uncertainty is high, at an operational level, inform ation exchange and learning will be the m ost important functions of interaction. Learning will occur whenever developer s have little experience with the technology, m ethods or orientation to be used, or lack the necessary skills. At the tactical level, the necessary feedback loops can be provided by iterations between realization activities. Technical experim ents, prototypes and tests can be part of such an iterative strategy. Coordination am ong different technic al special isms and/or workgroups will be important. This coordination should be intensive and consist of form al as well as informal mechanism s, for instance, supervision by experienced specialists, teambuilding activities, arranging teams of people who have worked together before, frequent meetings and sound docum enting (M cFarlan 1981) .
Proposition 3: High technical uncertainty requires (a) a blueprint of the functional design, followed by (b) iterative realization activities, during which (c) intensive coordination takes place through both formal and informal mechanism s.
In processes with a high resistance potential at the operational level, information will have to be exchanged with all future users (direct and indirect). In part resistance has a cogni tive base in the sense that uncertainty increases resistance. The availability of suf® cient information about what is going to happen , what will be the conseque nc es for the quality of working life and how to be able to function effectively in the changing and new work situation, will lower uncertainty. Besides, user m anagem ent has an im portant motivational function in com m unication. Personal attention for people can generate willingness to cooperate even when the solution chose n is less ideal for them. One should create explicit avenues to discuss fears, canalise dissatisfaction and m ourn possible personal losses (Korteweg 1988) . At the tactical level a step-by-step approach provides for the necessary points of recovery for the problem system and makes sure the developm ent process does not surpass the com prehension of organizational members (W issema et al. 1988) . At the strategic level conce rn for both the social and the organizational change requirements and implications is necessary, becau se the existing condi tions in this dom ain are insuf® cient and/or the developm ent is expec ted to have a profound impact on organizational members.
Proposition 4: A high resistance potential requires (a) à step -by-step' -approach with (b) som e interaction of the responsible managem ent and/or system developers with all users, aimed at motivating and information exchange and (c) a social-orga nizational orientation.
Som etimes situations will occur that are relatively simple, and in which principles of linearity, objectivity and technical rationality can be successfully applied. Then the dom inant actors can choose the most ef® cient approach, as they do not have to take measures for low risks. W e called proposition 5 the`ef® ciency proposition' and it is central to our m odel:
Proposition 5: In so far as the context is charac terized by low substantial risks, the correspond ing control measures as speci® ed in propos itions 1 to 4 are not neede d for system developm ent to be successful.
The`ef® ciency proposition; has the following consequence for situations in which the material preconditions are insuf® cient. There it would be required to rede® ne at the strategic approach level the SD process in such a way that substantial risks are lowered in order to enable the use of a more ef® cient approa ch. This pertains to our conception of a dynam ic ® t between context and approach characteristics.
A dynam ic ® t in SD proce sses
In our model the following assumptions were made about the establishm ent of a ® t between context and approach.
The possibility of contextual change s during an SD process has been mentioned in section 2. It has consequences for both the em pirical testing (see section 4) and the practical application of a contingency model. Determining a ® t between cont ext and approach at the start of the SD process is insuf® cient. Substantive change s during a process, im pede charting the variables for the process as a whole. The scenario should be rediagno sed and readjusted at regular intervals during the process or in the case of critical change s (® gure 1).
The choice and evaluation of the scenario for SD can be seen as an interpretation process. The m odel is focused on those contextual factors constituting a risk to successf ul developm ent of information systems, that is to factors that endang er the developm ent and subse quent use of a system. Given a certain m agnitude of these risks, the dom inant actors have to choose a ® tting approach.
How ever, material preconditions may be insuf® cient, so that actors cannot sustain the necessary approach requirem ents, that is, realize a m atch between context and strategy. They can, for instance, be short on personnel or time. Then a successf ul ® t will not be possible, unless the context is rede® ned in order to make the process less risky. This could be accomplished by limiting the target groups and/or the functional purposes of the system. It follow s that the dom inant actors should interpret the context in an active way: how can I de® ne, in¯uence, give m eaning to a part of reality in such a way that it becom es m anageable? To a certain extent the dom inant actors cannot only choose their approach but also their context, whethe r by de® nition or by intervention, that is by deliberately changing the context. This has to do with the fact, m entioned in section 2, that the theoretical distinction between context and strategy is an arbitrary one in the ® rst place. Only in a speci® c process can we tell which factors are endoge nic and which are exogen ic.
Next, the extent to which context factors constitute risks is partly depend ent on the local perceptions. It seems simple to de® ne beforehand that building a system for 10 people constitutes a low risk and building a system for 150 people a high risk. In reality, many contingency factors have to be taken into accou nt, meanin g that the interaction of the relevant factors has to be assessed for each process, and to determine to what extent this will constitute a risk. In a m odel we are able to state which contextual factors will give rise to which risks, but the assessm ent of these risks cannot be quanti® ed in advanc e by giving objective, absolute scales to com pute a risk pro® le (see also Nijhof 1990 ) . As we take the position that risks can only be estimated within the local context, our risk concept is relative and based on intersubjectivity.
Case studies
A multiple case study was undertaken to further develop and conduc t a ® rst preliminary test of the m odel (Van Offenbeek 1993) . Case material consisted of retrospective analyses of seven system developm ent processes. In each case a data processing, operational, and/or tactical managem ent information system was developed. In other words the research dom ain was lim ited to adm inistrative in contrast to technical automation and encompassed the pro® t as well as the non-pro® t sector. The cases were selected on the basis of the following two criteria: (1) the SD process should at least involve sever al social and/or organizational issues, and (2) the cases should vary on the context variables.
The developm ent of an information system cannot be approached as a single research unit, because substantive changes may occur in the variables examined during developm ent (see section 3.4). In our study, we divided som e of the seven cases in different episodes, studied separately, due to such changes. This resulted in ten episodes, ® ve of which could be considered failures and ® ve episodes that were considered successe s. W e de® ned a successful outcom e of SD as:`the developm ent of a system that is implemented and used on a regular basis' . The propositions were tentatively tested in each of these episodes.
Data collection and analy sis
Data collection took place during the last phase(s) of SD in each site, and consisted of elaborate semi-structured interviews with ® ve to eleven stakeholders (e.g. developers, users, management) and of the analysis of docum ents. Furtherm ore, six months after im plem entation of the system, questionnai res were ® lled out by direct users and m anagers. In one non-successful case the system was not implemented and, subse quent ly, no questionnaires were ® lled out.
The data from the semi-structured interviews and docum ents were used to determ ine the characteristics of context and approach. This resulted in a rich case description as well as a qualitative description of each context and approach variable. The case description was fed back to the organization.
Next, three researchers who were familiar with the cases rated the risks on a three-point scale: low±m oderate±high risk. For this purpose each of the substantial types of risk was divided into four m easures. The amount of inter-rater agreem ent, corrected for coincidence (0 = no agreem ent, 1 = perfect agreem ent; see Tinsly and W eiss 1975) , was satisfactory (for functional uncertainty and con¯ict potential 1.00, for technical uncertainty 0.65 and for resistance potential 0.82). Differences were discussed am ong the three researchers and a ® nal conclusion was reached. The descriptions of the approach variables were used to rate on a ® ve-point Likert-type scale (--, -, 0, + , + + ) whethe r each approach requirement that was mentioned in the propositions had been ful® lled in the SD process. This rating asked for less subjective judge m ent and was done by one researcher and checked by two others. To determine whether the propositions were suppor ted a two-point scale:`not ful® lled' (--, -0) or`ful® lled' (+ , + + ) was used.
The indicator for success of SD, a dichotom ous measure, was whether the resulting system was actually implemented, and used on a regular basis (that is adopted by the users). This measure was chosen because it is a rather unam biguous and robust measure. In addition we used questionnaires to m easure the experienced usability of the system, the perceived change s in the quality of work, the user satisfaction, and the perceived ef® ciency of the SD. How ever, these data were not used to analyse the propositions presented in this article, because these m easures are less robust, do not ® t within our narrow de® nition of success, and some of the m easures cannot be considered in the case of failure, when no system is im plem ented or is not used on a regular basis.
Results
Proposition 1: High functional un certainty requires (a) an early interaction between know ledgeable users and system developers, and, (b) an iterative process model aimed at the exchange of information and learning.
A high functional uncertainty was found in only one episode (D1). As can be seen in table 4, here, the requirements for controlling functional uncertainty were not met. A classic linear strategy was followed and only one of the three user organizations was involved in the information analysis, while the others did not get involved until the design phase . During the design, it turned out that processe s in the three organizations were not fully interchange able. Because of this the information analysis presented problem s for the design team and the resulting design was even rejected and had to be redone.
In most other episodes (B, C1 and 2, D2, E1, F and G) we found a moderate am ount of functional uncertainty. Explorations of these data suggest that moderate functional uncertainty asks for the same approach as high functional uncertainty, but here an iterative process model is not necessary unless users have little experience with system developm ent and/or little comprehension of their ow n tasks. The ef® ciency proposition can be applied to the two cases with a low functional uncertainty. So these cases will be discusse d und er proposition 5.
Proposition 2: A high con¯ict potential requires (a) early and represent ational interaction am ong the user groups involved, aimed at negotiating and collective learning, and (b) formal coordinat ion of the interaction.
The episodes with a low con¯ict potential are discussed unde r proposition 5. As table 5 show s a high con¯ict potential had to be controlled in four episodes.
In two of them , D1 and E1, the approach did not meet the hypoth esized requirements and both episodes failed. In E1, for example, the different interests and views were not openly discussed in the ® rst phases: central management was not represented in the project. W hereas the central and decentral users participated, they did this separately from each other, without interaction between them . Coordination was largely based on m utual adjustment. Formal supervision and standardization of output were insuf® cient, for exam ple, a feasibility report was quickly written at the start, which the responsible manager decided not to sign. Nevertheless he did not openly intervene and the project team just went on with the system analysis. The report resulting from that phase could be read in different ways. Next, a prototype was built and im plem ented. Som e months later central managem ent cancelled the project in line with the wishes of the central users.
The other two episodes with a high con¯ict potential, B and D2, were successful. In both case s the approach was in line with our proposition.
In the three other episodes (F, G, E2) we found a m oderate am ount of con¯ict potential. Exploration of these data suggests that m oderate con¯ict potential calls for the same approach as high con¯ict potential. For exam ple, in case F which failed, representatives of the groups involved interacted early, but nobody was appointed the form al responsibility for the SD process and there were no clear agreem ents about the interaction (a lack of form al coordination).
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Scenarios for system developm ent 
The data supported the proposition, but we still wonder whether in the case of an extremely high con¯ict potential as in D1, the dom inant actors should not try to reduce the risk beforehand. Reduction can be achieved by either lim iting the de® nition of the problem system , or by actively changing the contextual factors giving rise to the risk. In episode D2 the requirem ents were met, but also the con¯ict potential was not as high as in the ® rst episode of case D: in episode D2 the system was developed for one user organization instead of three as in episode D1. Moreover, further analysis of the data led us to believe that in the case of a high or moderate con¯ict poten tial, early, representational interaction is needed not only am ong user groups, but am ong all groups in the problem system who hold a stake in the SD process.
Proposition 3: High technical uncertainty requires (a) a blueprint of the functional design, followed by (b) iterative realization activities, during w hich (c) intensive coordination takes place through both formal and informal mechanism s.
The cases with a low technic al uncertainty will be discusse d under proposition 5. Technical uncertainty was high in case D. The realization process passed off considerably m ore successfully after the coordination (formal as well as informal) became more intensive in episode D2. In episode D1 formal procedures prohibited interactions between builders and testers. Serious tensions arose between the two groups because they were not allowed to talk directly with each other, e.g. explain to each 
Failure cases
other why som ething was seen as a m istake or how a previous problem had been solved. How ever, while formal coordination alone m ay not be suf® cient, it is still necessary. For instance, in the sam e case som etimes there was no way of know ing which version of the design was the correct one. W hereas in the successf ul cases B and D2, it was perceived as very im portant that the developer s followed a standar d procedure for modi® cations of the design, that was strictly supervised by the project leader. In all cases the realization activities were, to a certain extent, characterized by iterations. Apparently, it is not necessarily more ef® cient to separate technical design steps, program ming and testing in clearly separated phases. In episode A design, realization and testing phase s were not separated, while this case had relatively the highe st ef® ciency score. Furtherm ore, our data were not detailed enough to determine whether high technical uncertainty requires signi® cantly more iterations than low technical uncertainty.
In the other cases, m entioned in The three cases (A, C1, C2) with a low resistance potential will be discusse d under proposition 5. Case B was successf ul, despite the high resistance potential. This outcom e can be explained by the approach taken (table 7) and it thereby suppor ts our proposition. In E1 after an informal start, the resistance potential had become high, as the goals of the developm ent at the strategic approach level had been expand ed. As a consequenc e, the im pact on the work organization was m uch greater. How ever, as table 7 show s, the other approach characteristics did not meet the accom pa nying requirem ents as speci® ed in proposition 4. Therefore, the subsequent cancelling of the process for political reasons supports the proposition.
After the resistance potential in case E decreased due to factors external to the developm ent process (changes in the organizational structure and three stakeholder s m oving to other jobs), the developm ent was resumed. This tim e the project (E2) was successful, while the resistance potential was m oderate. It resulted in a system that was implemented and used on a regular basis in the central planning department and a few other departm ents. Still, because system use was voluntary the majority of the decentral departments had not yet adopted it. The approach was a`stepby-step' one, but the other requirements speci® ed in proposition 4 were not met.
In case D2 the resistance potential was also m oderate. In this episode user m anagement interacted with all users and at the strategic level the orientation was social organizational, but a`step-by-step' approach was not found. Still, this process was successful. W e should add that D2 was a large-scale project unde r tim e pressure. Because of these two characteristics a`step-by-step' approa ch could not be realized. How ever, from three alternative ways of implem enting the user m anagement chose the way that would least harm the direct users. This may have com pensated for the fact that they did not use a`step-by-step' approach.
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Scenarios for system developm ent Table 7 . Resistance potential and whether approach requirements were ful® lled.
Approach characteristics
Interaction of
Socialmanagement organizational Risk
Step-by-step with all users orientation 
Successful cases
Failure cases
In three other episodes (D1, F, G) mentioned in table 7, the resistance potential was m oderate. The approach did not ful® l the requirem ents and the developm ent was not successful. Qualitative analysis of these data sugges ts that the cause of failure should be (partly) attributed to not controlling the resistance potential. The explorative data from these cases led to the following proposition: A moderate resistance potential requires (a) (table 7) . In line with our ef® ciency proposition, case A was successful while most of the requirements stated in propositions 1 to 4 were not ful® lled. No iterative process model was used to specify the user needs, nor form ally coordinated and early representational interaction among user groups, nor a social-organizational orientation. No bluep rint of the design was made before the start of the realization activities and we also found no intensive use of form al coordination m echanism s during the realization activities.
The episodes C1, E1 and F failed, while scoring low on som e risks and moderate or high on others. Can we explain that their failure was due to not controlling the moderate and/or high risks? C1 scored low on technical uncertainty and con¯ict as well as resistance potential. The functional uncertainty was m oderate: the users really wanted a system , but were inexperienced and awareness of their problem s, goals and needs was low. The user department had only talked a few times with the Inform ation Systems department about their needs, on the basis of which the IS department wrote a feasibility study. During the next half year there was no contact between the IS departm ent and the users. Then the users received an application that did not m eet their dem ands, so they hired a student to locally develop a better application for them (episode C2). Episode C1 is in line with proposition 5, because the causes of the failure are not technical in nature, nor are they caused by resistance or con¯icts. A likewise explanation can be given for the failure of case F, in which technical uncertainty was low. In fact, the software was im plemented in this case and was for som e tim e used on a temporary basis and the technical quality was clearly not the reason the project failed. The lack of control of the other risks (all moderate, see tables 4, 5 and 7) in this case explains the failure satisfactorily. In episode E1 the technical uncertainty was also low. The failure of episode E1 was caused, as has been explained (see tables 5 and 7), by not controlling the con¯ict and resistance potential. The problems were not technical in nature as the pilot departm ent was actually already using the developed software when the central management stopped the project.
The other two episodes E2 and C2 were characterized by a low resistanc e potential. In line with proposition 5, the requirem ents for controlling a high resistance potential were not met, while the cases were successf ul (table 7) .
In sum mary, we can conclude that our data are in line with proposition 5: no control measures have to be take n for low risks. Still, because of another ® nding in episode C2, we think the ef® ciency proposition should be slightly am ended. In episode C2 the developer , the student, was inexperienced. His inexperience being the only technical uncertainty, this risk was rated low. How ever, the realization process was iterative and this approach characteristic appeared to be essential, because the developer was inexperienced and needed to learn. A m ore ef® cient linear approa ch would not have been feasible. So we added proposition 5a to the ef® ciency proposition.
Proposition 5a: Independent of any other technical uncertainty inexperienced system develope rs shoul d be given room for iterations am ong stages during the realization activities in order for system developm ent to be successful.
Conc lusions
Based on these results, we conclude that there is a substantive need for a m ore¯exible choice of SD scenarios, especially with respect to the social and organizational aspects of the m anagement of these processes. The use of a contingency m odel was supported by the data. Only those system developm ent processes with matching approach and contingency factors were successf ul. The results of the ten episodes of system developm ent were in line with our propositions. Several alternative explanations of the outcom es of the processes were also considered, but all failed: neither the ® ve risk scores (taken togethe r or separately) nor the approach factors (taken together or separately) could explain the outcom e of the ten episodes, whereas m ost of our propositions were able to explain the outcom es as has been show n in section 5. In so far as our model speci® es ® ts between risk and approach it can, when suf® ciently tested, be used in a prescriptive way. The model can also be used to describe the risks and the approach of an SD process. For such a descriptive purpose, the m odel was show n to be applicable to a wide variety of system developm ent processes (as our cases contained am ple variance on the characteristics of the context).
How ever, som e limitations of our largely explor ative study have to be taken into account. First, the seven processes that were analysed constitute a very sm all subse t of the vast amount of SD scenarios (combinations of context and approach) that are theoretically possible. Obviously, the propositions need to be tested on far m ore cases.
Second, the ® ts between risks factors of a moderate m agnitude and approach characteristics have thus far not been tested at all. W e have only formulated propositions about the control of moderate risks on the basis of the explorative ® ndings reported in this article. Moreover, a systematic com parison of low, high, and moderate risks could generate m ore clarity about the nature of the interaction effect of risk factors and approach characteristics on successf ul system developm ent, for exam ple on its linearity (Schoon hoven 1981) .
Third, propositions only speci® ed simple relations between context factors and one or m ore approach variables. More attention should be given to m ore com plex interactions, for exam ple, among various approach variables as these will not all be independen t (see Van Offenbeek 1993) .
Four th, when we look at our framework from the viewpoint of the practitioner, it can be said that the propositions are rather general in nature. W e discusse d our framework with practitioners and tried to evaluate other cases with it. Each time we were left with the feeling that the propositions do indeed apply, but that their translation into more detailed requirements for a speci® c SD approach is the real proof of the puddin g. In terms of Thorngate' s postulate of comm ensur ate com ple xity (W eick 1979: 35) our model seem s to be quite simple and possibly generally applicable, but in the inevitable trade-off we have lost som e accuracy.
W e described a sm all and heterogeneous sample of SD processes with the m odel. Not only shoul d m ore cases be studied, a sensible next step would be to draw a sample which is quite hom ogeneou s and to study those cases longitudinally from the start. Such a design can provide greater accur acy, although generalization will be (m ore) lim ited. Also, this design would enable further investigation of the way in which, and the conditions under which, decisions about the SD strategy are made. This would shed more light on the dem ands that a contingency framework will have to m eet in order to be useful in SD practices.
The strength of a contingency m odel like the one presented here lies in the description of ® ts made possible by analytical restriction and distinction of the variables to be taken into account. This implies a certain am ount of simpli® cation, but such an analytical approach can help practitioners to under stand a complex reality and it provide s reference points for determ ining their interventions.
In our m odel we have integrated organizational and cognitive social psycho logical know ledg e. Tim e and again organizational settings appear to have a strong in¯uence on hum an behaviour (Davis-Blake and Pfeffer 1989) . People are bound to their context (both literally and metaphorically) and are both active participants and passive victims (Goedvolk and Smeets 1991) . A contingency model can help make the context eligible and debatable and specify alternative SD approaches. Organization studies contribute to our unde rstandin g of the strategic and tactical level of the SD approach, cognitive social psychological notions can help in understanding the interaction in SD processes, the operational level. To sum marize, models like ours can be tools that assist practitioners to step back and consider the context they are in, and subsequently determine their approach. A contingency m odel helps them to see alternatives, while they remain responsible for the rationality of their choice.
